



U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series #9:
The Scope of "Class or Kind of
Merchandise" in Antidumping
and Countervailing Duty Cases
In antidumping and countervailing duty investigations, the Department
of Commerce determines at the outset the scope of the "class or kind of
merchandise" subject to the investigation. If an order is issued, Com-
merce later must apply its definition of the class or kind of merchandise
to imports whose inclusion may be questionable. This article examines
recent developments with respect to both initial and subsequent scope
determinations.
I. Pre-Order Determinations of Class or Kind of Merchandise
Under the countervailing duty (CVD) law, the Department of Commerce
(Commerce) I determines whether a foreign government or person is pro-
viding, directly or indirectly, subsidies to "a class or kind of merchandise"
imported into the United States. 2 If Commerce finds subsidies and, where
*General Counsel to the U.S. Trade Representative.
tDeputy General Counsel to the U.S. Trade Representative and Chairman, Section 301
Committee.
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the authors.
I. Commerce is the "administering authority" that determines whether merchandise
subject to investigation has been subsidized. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1979, § 2(a), 44 Fed. Reg.
69,274 (1979), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. App. § 1170 (1982); Exec. Order No. 12,188, 3 C.F.R.
§§ 131, 135 (1983).
2. Section 701(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended [hereinafter cited as Act], 19
U.S.C. § 1671(a)(1) (Supp. 11 1984).
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required, 3 the International Trade Commission (Commission) finds in-
jury,4 then offsetting countervailing duties are applied to "such merchan-
dise." 5 Likewise under the antidumping (AD) law, Commerce 6 determines
whether a class or kind of foreign merchandise has been sold in the United
States at less than its "fair value." 7 If the Commission finds injury by
reason of imports of "that merchandise," 8 then an order is issued requiring
the imposition of offsetting duties.9
Most CVD and AD investigations are begun in response to a petition
filed by an interested party on behalf of a U.S. industry, alleging the
necessary elements for relief and providing supporting information rea-
sonably available to petitioner. 10 If Commerce determines that the re-
quirements for a petition are satisfied, it must then initiate an investigation'1
to determine whether "the class or kind of merchandise described in the
petition" has been subsidized 12 or sold at less than fair value. 13 Normally
Commerce's description of the class or kind of merchandise reflects the
scope suggested by petitioner in its petition. However, Commerce is re-
sponsible for determining the appropriate scope, 14 and may define it dif-
ferently from petitioner.
3. Injury determinations are required in CVD investigations of merchandise from coun-
tries: (1) to whose governments the United States applies the Agreement on Interpretation
and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (Subsidies Code), 31 U.S.T. 531, T.I.A.S. No. 9619; (2) whose governments have
undertaken obligations substantially equivalent to those established by the Subsidies Code;
and (3) with whose governments the United States concluded treaties of Friendship, Com-
merce and Navigation prior to June 19, 1979, that required most-favored-nation treatment
in this regard. See § 701(b) of the Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1671(b) (1982).
4. See §§ 701(a)(2), 703(a), and 705(b) of the Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(2), 1671b(a) (1982),
1671d(b) (Supp. 11 1984). Note that the Commission focuses on material injury to a U.S.
"industry," defined in terms of producers of a "like product." Section 771(4), (10) of the
Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677(4) (Supp. 11 1984), (10) (1982). The Act does not reconcile the terms
"class or kind of merchandise" and "like product."
5. Section 701(a) of the Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (Supp. 11 1984).
6. See supra note I.
7. Section 731(1) of the Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1673(t) (1982).
8. Section 731(1) of the Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1673(2) (Supp. 11 1984). Unlike some CVD
investigations, all AD investigations require an injury determination. See also supra note 4.
9. Section 731 of the Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (Supp. 11 1984).
10. Sections 702(b) and 732(b) of the Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(b) (Supp. 11 1984), 1673a(b)
(1982). Commerce's regulations require petitioner to provide "a detailed description of the
imported merchandise in question, including its technical characteristics and uses, and,
where appropriate, its tariff classification under the Tariff Schedules of the United States."
19 C.F.R. § 353.36(a)(4) (AD), 355.26(a)(4) (CVD) (1986).
11. If Commerce initiates an investigation, it must publish a notice containing a description
of the merchandise subject to the investigation, based on consultations with the Commission.
19 C.F.R. §§ 353.37(b) (AD), 355.27(b) (CVD) (1986).
12. Section 702(c)(2) of the Act, 19 U.S.C. § 167Ia(c)(2) (1982).
13. Section 732(c)(2) of the Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(c)(2) (1982).
14. Sections 701(a), 731(1) of the Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(a), 1673(1).
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Commerce may also initiate a CVD or AD investigation on its own
motion, if it determines from the information available to it that an in-
vestigation is warranted. 15 In such "self-initiated" cases, Commerce like-
wise must define the class or kind of merchandise it chooses to investigate.
The most notable recent development with respect to Commerce's def-
inition of class or kind of merchandise is its action in self-initiating 16 an
investigation of dynamic random access memory semiconductors having
a memory capacity of 256 kilobits and above.17 With respect to high
technology, short shelf-life products like semiconductors, new "genera-
tions" of products emerge quickly. Competitors strive to sell high volumes
of the product quickly, before it rapidly becomes obsolete by the devel-
opment of a new, more powerful, more commercially appealing product.
Semiconductor producers complain that the AD law is of limited use for
such products, because by the time an AD investigation can be completed
and antidumping duties imposed, technology is likely to have largely moved
on to the next product generation. As a result, the law can never quite
catch up to technological advancement.
Recognizing this phenomenon, Commerce chose to define the class or
kind of merchandise subject to its self-initiated investigation broadly. It
focused not just on one particular type of semiconductor-the "256K
DRAM"--but on likely future generations of such "chips"--the 256K
DRAM and above. If Commerce found sales at less than "fair value"
and the Commission found injury with respect to this broadly defined
class or kind of merchandise, then new generations of dynamic random
access memory semiconductors having a memory capacity larger than 256
kilobits would presumably be subject to antidumping duties, without the
requirement of a new investigation and new determinations by Commerce
and the Commission.
In its preliminary determination, Commerce found sales significantly
below "fair value." 18 These preliminary dumping margins were based on
15. Sections 702(a), 732(a) of the Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(a), 1673a(a) (Supp. 11 1984).
16. This was the first time Commerce exercised its authority to self-initiate an investigation
on any product other than a steel product that had been subject to monitoring under a
Trigger Price Mechanism.
17. Commerce uses the term "Kilobits" for Kilobytes"; the latter is the common and
undoubtedly the correct terminology. Dynamic random access memory semiconductors of
256 Kilobits and above from Japan, 50 Fed. Reg. 51,450 (1985) (initiation). Moreover, Com-
merce proposed to include as well processed wafers and die produced in Japan and assembled
into finished DRAMs in another country prior to their importation into the United States.
However, in its preliminary determination, it reported its determination not to investigate
such third-country imports, based upon its conclusion "that these third-country imports
were not a part of the concern which gave rise to this investigation." Dynamic random
access memory semiconductors of 256 Kilobits and above from Japan, 51 Fed. Reg. 9475
(1986) (preliminary).
18. Dynamic random access memory semiconductors of 256 Kilobits and above from
Japan, 51 Fed. Reg. 9475 (1986) (preliminary).
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comparisons of United States price and foreign market value of 256K
DRAMs only. Although Commerce found some sales of a one megabit
DRAM (a DRAM with a memory capacity of 1,000 kilobits, or one mega-
bit) from Japan in the United States during the time period under inves-
tigation (July through December 1985), these limited sales were disre-
garded as not being in the "ordinary course of trade." 19 This was because
the quantities involved were so small and represented essentially sample
sales of a new product that is expected in the relatively near future largely
to replace the 256K DRAM (which in turn has largely replaced the 64K
DRAM, which likewise largely replaced the 16K DRAM).
Commerce's expansive definition of the scope of this investigation re-
flects its concern to make the laws it administers as flexible and responsive
as possible to the needs of high technology industries. Such responsive-
ness could result in a greater reliance upon the CVD and AD laws by
such industries when faced with unfairly traded imports, as well as less
Congressional effort to amend those laws sweepingly so as to accomplish
the same objective.
11. Post-Order Determinations of the
Scope of an Order's Application
In addition to Commerce's determination of the scope of an investi-
gation at its outset, it must also determine, after an investigation's con-
clusion and the issuance of an order, the scope of that order's application.
This task has been complicated in some cases by the Department of the
Treasury's conduct of the less-than-fair-value investigation prior to 1980,
when Commerce instead became the "administering authority." 20 This
section of the article examines the key judicial decisions construing Com-
merce's authority in this regard.
A. ROYAL BUSINESS MACHINES
In Royal Business Machines, Inc. v. United States,2 1 a typewriter im-
porter sought to enjoin Commerce from "retroactively" modifying a 1980
antidumping order to include a particular kind of typewriter, the Royal
Administrator. Petitioner Smith-Corona, Consumer Products Division,
SCM Corporation (SCM), a domestic manufacturer of typewriters, had
expressly included the Royal Administrator, among other typewriters, as
the object of its antidumping petition filed in 1979 with the Commissioner
19. Section 773(a)(1)(A) of the Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 11 1984).
20. Supra note 1.
21. 507 F. Supp. 1007 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1980), aff'd, 669 F.2d 692 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
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of Customs. The Department of the Treasury initiated an investigation to
determine whether such typewriters had been sold at less than fair value, 22
and reached a tentative affirmative determination. 23 After Commerce be-
came the "administering authority" responsible for implementing this
portion of the antidumping law,24 it made a final determination 25 that the
typewriters involved had been sold at less than fair value. 26 Shortly there-
after the International Trade Commission determined2 7 that imports of
"portable electric typewriters," including the Royal Administrator,2 8 were
causing material injury to a United States industry. 29 Commerce then
issued an order directed to portable electric typewriters, defined by ref-
erence to an item of the Tariff Schedules of the United States covering
all typewriters. 30
Following issuance of the order, plaintiff (an importer) sought exclusion
of the Royal Administrator. SCM maintained it was included. In response
to Commerce's request for its advice as to the proper tariff classification
of the Royal Administrator, the Customs Service "determined" that it
was non-portable and therefore removed from the scope of the order.3 1
Commerce nonetheless took the view that it was included, and was about
to issue a "clarifying" directive to that effect. 32
The court ruled that an antidumping order itself is "purely a ministerial
act" 3 3 that "must express the result of the previous determinations with-
out alterations." 34 Consequently, neither Commerce nor the Customs Ser-
vice "could legally change the results of the less than fair value and injury
22. 44 Fed. Reg. 29,191 (1979).
23. 45 Fed. Reg. 1220 (1980).
24. Supra note 1.
25. See 735(a) of the Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(a) (Supp. I1 1984).
26. 45 Fed. Reg. 28,416 (1980).
27. See 735(b) of the Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(b) (Supp. 11 1984).
28. The Commission's final injury determination concluded that: "The Royal 'Adminis-
trator' typewriter for customer purposes is classified as a portable electric typewriter....
The 'Administrator' is priced competitively with portable electric typewriters and is marketed
in much the same way. Thus, for the purposes of this investigation, the commission has
concluded the Administrator in the category of imports which are subject to this investi-
gation." Portable Electric Typewriters from Japan, Inv. No. 731-TA-12 (final), USITC Pub.
1062 at 3n.] (May 1980). (See 45 Fed. Reg. 30,186 (1980).)
29. Id.
30. T.S.U.S. 676.05.
31. 507 F. Supp. at 1011, referring (at nn. 10 and 11) to letters between Leonard M.
Shambon, Director, Office of Compliance, International Trade Administration, U.S. De-
partment of Commerce; and Salvatore E. Caramagno, Director, Classification and Value
Division of the Customs Service.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1012.
34. Id. at 1013.
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determinations or modify the facts or legal conclusions on which those
determinations depended. 35" '
The court explained that each stage of the statutory proceeding-ini-
tiation, the Commission's preliminary injury determination, Commerce's
preliminary and final less-than-fair-value determinations, the Commis-
sion's final determination, and issuance of the order-simply "maintains
the scope passed on from the previous stage." 36 As a result, so long as
Commerce and the Commission clearly considered the Royal Adminis-
trator included in their investigations, then that typewriter is within the
scope of the antidumping order.
B. DIVERSIFIED PRODUCTS
A more difficult issue was presented in Diversified Products Corp. v.
United States. 37 First, the dumping finding concerned was made by Trea-
sury rather than Commerce. Second, somewhat similar to future gener-
ations of semiconductors with respect to Commerce's investigation of
dynamic random access memory semiconductors of 256 kilobits and above,
the product concerned had not been developed at the time of the 1972
dumping investigation.
Diversified Products began as a petition filed in 1971 requesting initiation
of a dumping investigation of bicycle speedometers from Japan. In 1972
the Treasury Department determined that such bicycle speedometers were
being sold at less than fair value, 38 and the Tariff Commission (now the
International Trade Commission 39 ) found injury to a United States in-
dustry by reason of such imports. 40 During its investigation, the Com-
mission sent questionnaires to domestic producers and importers that
defined bicycle speedometers as "an instrument attached to a bicycle or
exercise machine..." (emphasis added). 4 1 The staff report to the Com-
mission further reflected coverage of speedometers used on both bicycles
and exercise machines. 42
During its first administrative review of Treasury's finding, Commerce
preliminarily determined that double-gear hub drive speedometers-used
exclusively on exercise machines-were not within the scope of the 1972
dumping finding,4 3 but reached the opposite conclusion in its final deter-
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1014.
37. 572 F. Supp. 883 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
38. 37 Fed. Reg. 24,826 (1972).
39. Section 171 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2231 (1982).
40. Bicycle Speedometers from Japan, Inv. No. AA 1921-98, TC Pub. 513 (1972).
41. Id.; see also 572 F. Supp. at 885.
42. Id.; see also 572 F. Supp. at 885.
43. Bicycle Speedometers from Japan, 46 Fed. Reg. 56,486 (1981).
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mination. 44 The plaintiff, an importer, then sued in the Court of Inter-
national Trade, contending that double-gear hub drive speedometers are
beyond the scope of the 1972 dumping finding. Plaintiff argued that: (1)
Commerce lacks any authority to determine, in the course of an admin-
istrative review, whether a particular imported article is within the scope
of a dumping finding; (2) in any event, Commerce is bound by classification
determinations of the Customs Service (which classified double-gear hub
drive speedometers as "other than" bicycle speedometers 45); and (3)
Commerce's determination that the scope of Treasury's dumping finding
encompassed double-gear hub drive speedometers was not supported by
substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise was not in accordance
with law.
The court cited Royal Business Machine's46 implicit recognition that
Commerce enjoys authority not only to define the scope of an antidumping
investigation, but also to clarify the statement of its scope. The court
reasoned that Commerce necessarily must also have the power to clarify
the scope of a prior dumping finding as well. 4 7 Because the Act relegates
the Customs Service to "a mere 'ministerial role,' "48 the court concluded
that Commerce-not the Customs Service--is responsible for clarifying,
where necessary, the scope of dumping findings and antidumping duty
orders." 49 Consequently, Commerce is not bound by Customs classifi-
cation determinations.
The court also concluded that Commerce's determination was sup-
ported by substantial evidence on the record of the investigation. Even
if the merchandise concerned was "an 'orange' among 'apples'," 50 its
inclusion by Commerce and the Commission was decisive. 51
In deciding whether the class or kind of merchandise encompassed in
Treasury's 1972 finding included a product not yet developed in 1972,
Commerce considered the merchandise's general physical characteristics,
expectations of ultimate purchasers, channels of trade, ultimate use and
cost. The court concluded that Commerce's application of these criteria
to the facts on the record of the investigation and its conclusions were
supported by substantial evidence on the record.
44. Bicycle Speedometers from Japan, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,978 28,979 (1982).
45. 572 F. Supp. at 887.
46. Supra note 21.
47. 572 F. Supp. at 887.
48. Id., quoting from Royal Business Machines, Inc. v. United States, 507 F. Supp. 1007,
1014 n.18 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1980), aff'd, 669 F.2d. 692 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
49. 572 F. Supp. at 887.
50. Id. at 888, quoting from Royal Business Machines, Inc. v. United States, 507 F. Supp.
1007, 1013 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1980), aff'd, 669 F.2d 692 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
51. 572 F. Supp. at 889.
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C. ALSTHOM ATLANTIQUE & COGENEL, INC. V. UNITED STATES
Like Diversified Products, Aisthom Atlantique & Cogenel, Inc. v. United
States52 involved a Treasury dumping finding whose scope Commerce
subsequently construed to include the merchandise in question, in this
case shunt reactors. In 1972 the Treasury Department, in response to a
petition filed by Westinghouse Electric Corporation, determined that large
power transformers from France were being sold in the United States at
less than fair value. 53 Treasury did not expressly refer to shunt reactors
in its initial notice of a dumping proceeding 54 or in its final determination; 55
nor were any shunt reactors in fact imported from France during the
period of investigation. However, Treasury had amended its notice of a
dumping proceeding "to make it clear that the notice applies to all types
of transformers rated 10,000 KVA or above ... including but not limited
to shunt reactors." 56
During its administrative review of this order, Alsthom requested a
hearing to discuss whether shunt reactors were within the class or kind
of merchandise covered by Treasury's original antidumping order on large
power transformers from France. At the hearing on July 30, 198 1, Alsthom
claimed that shunt reactors were not subject to Treasury's antidumping
order since there never was a valid finding that they had been imported,
had been sold at less-than-fair-value, or had caused or threatened injury
to a United States industry.
In the final results of its administrative review, Commerce made three
rulings in response to Alsthom's claims. First, it concluded that shunt
reactors were within the class or kind of merchandise covered by Trea-
sury's finding. Second, it held that it lacked authority to change the scope
of Treasury's antidumping finding during an administrative review. Third,
it ruled that not all elements of a class or kind of merchandise must be
exported to the United States during the period of investigation to be
within the scope of the finding, and that not all elements must be sold at
less than fair value. 57
The Court of International Trade reversed Commerce on the second
point, ruling that Commerce does have legislative authority to determine
52. 604 F. Supp. 1234 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985), rev'd, Appeal Nos. 85-2082, 2158 (Fed. Cir.
March 24, 1986).
53. 37 Fed. Reg. 11,772 (1972).
54. 35 Fed. Reg. 9934 (1970).
55. 37 Fed. Reg. 11,772 (1972).
56. 36 Fed. Reg. 11,308 (1971). In addition to Treasury's finding of sales at less than fair
value, the United States Tariff Commission (now the International Trade Commission; see
supra note 39) determined that an industry in the United States was being injured by less-
than-fair-value imports of large power transformers from France.
57. 47 Fed. Reg. 10,268 (1982) (final). The preliminary results of administrative review
were published at 46 Fed. Reg. 32,928 (1981).
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whether the original Treasury decision was in error, and if so to amend
the scope of its finding. 58 The court cited legislative history indicating
that Commerce can review whether sales at less than fair value exist. 59
It reasoned that Commerce-now the administering authority-should not
be forced to follow an erroneous Treasury order until modified by Trea-
sury, which since 1980 has lacked the experienced personnel and facilities
to conduct such reviews. The court therefore remanded the case to Com-
merce to redetermine the scope of the class or kind of merchandise.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court,
ruling that Commerce "cannot change the scope of an underlying anti-
dumping determination when Treasury has specifically included the article
within the scope of its underlying determination." 60 Finding "no ques-
tion" that the class or kind of merchandise initially investigated included
shunt reactors, 61 the appeals court denied any authority on the part of
Commerce to review whether Treasury's inclusion of shunt reactors was
in error: "In a section 751 review, the ITA (International Trade Admin-
istration, Department of Commerce) does not have the power to substitute
its judgment for Treasury's when Treasury has specifically included an
item within its antidumping determination. 62"'
D. CONCLUSION
The judicial review of several Commerce decisions has clarified sub-
stantially several issues regarding the scope of the class or kind of mer-
chandise subject to an antidumping or countervailing duty order. Where
a Treasury finding does not clearly cover a particular item, Commerce
has authority to determine whether it is included. However, where Trea-
sury specifically included an article within its finding, Commerce is pow-
erless to determine de novo whether inclusion of such articles was proper.
On the other hand, where the original investigation was conducted by
Commerce, the scope of any order finally issued derives from the scope
of the investigation during each preceding stage, from initiation through
the Commission's preliminary injury determination, Commerce's prelim-
inary and then final determinations, and the Commission's final injury
determination.
58. 604 F. Supp. 1234 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985). The court also held that Alsthom's suit was
timely, because it was contesting Commerce's section 751 review of Treasury's antidumping
determination, not the underlying Treasury finding itself.
59. S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 80 (1979), cited id. at 1237.
60. Appeal Nos. 85-2082, 2158 at 15 (emphasis in original).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 16. The appeals court also ruled that Alsthom's appeal was not timely, and
reversed the lower court on this issue as well.
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The court has not yet ruled on other interesting class or kind questions,
however. Notably Commerce's decision in Large Power Transformers
from France-that not all elements of the class or kind of merchandise
must be imported into the United States during the period of investigation
or sold at less than fair value-was not reviewed by either the lower or
appeals court. The outcome of that issue will influence how much dis-
cretion Commerce may exercise in drafting its investigations broadly to
cover developing and not yet imported high technology products.
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